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Abstract 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a linear programming based method for evaluating 
performance of comparable production units such as firms. Although the method is already 
extensively applied in many areas of economics, its use in environmental economics and related 
fields remains limited. The purpose of this paper is to present basic principles of DEA and evaluate 
its application possibilities for a range of environmental valuation problems. We show how DEA 
has to be adjusted to the context of environmental performance, eco-efficiency and Cost-Benefit 
analysis (CBA). By modifying the traditional DEA framework to the specific features and purposes 
of environmental application we show that the valuation principles to which DEA is based on can 
offer useful insights and complement the conventional toolbox of environmental economists in 
valuation of the environmental services in general. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While goods and services exchanged in the market place have readily observable measures of their 
value, the market price, many environmental goods and services such as clean air and water 
resources are not generally valued at all. The absence of markets for environmental services is, in 
fact, one of the prime examples of the market failure. It is well known that the lack of economic 
value for environmental goods generally leads to over-exploitation and degradation of these 
resources. Therefore, economic valuation of the environment and its services is one of the most 
fundamental topics of environmental economics. 
 
Standard valuation methods of environmental economics can be classified into two main categories: 
the stated preference methods and the revealed preference methods. The first category includes 
methods such as Contingent Valuation (CV) that addresses people directly to inquire about their 
willingness to pay for environmental goods, asking the respondents to describe their behavior in a 
hypothetical situation. While there are many different strategies to encourage the respondents to 
state their true willingness to pay, all approaches of this category rely on their subjective valuation 
of the environmental issue at hand. The second category rejects the idea of asking individuals’ 
opinions, and instead, tries to infer their willingness to pay indirectly based on observed behavior. 
Notable examples of the revealed preference approaches include the Travel Cost Method and the 
hedonic estimation. While the revealed preference techniques stand on a more objective ground, 
their scope of environmental valuation tends to be more limited. The revealed preference 
approaches can be applied in situations where people already pay for an environmental good or 
service in one way or another, and this payment can be directly observed and associated with the 
use of that particular good or service. The relative strengths and weaknesses of the stated and the 
revealed preference methods have been subject to lively debate among academics, to which we take 
no position here.1 
 
This paper presents Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an alternative valuation technique, and 
evaluates its application possibilities for a range of environmental valuation problems. While DEA 
is not yet widely diffused into the field of environmental economics, it is frequently applied in 
many other areas of applied economic sciences, including agricultural economics, development 
economics, financial economics, public economics, and macroeconomic policy, among others, in 
addition to its traditional confinements in productivity and efficiency analysis. In its purest form, 
the unique valuation principle of DEA does not depend on either stated or revealed preferences. 
Rather, it turns the value problem other way around, and asks what kind of prices would favor this 
or that particular firm or project. Relying on the implicit preferences of firm managers and the 
project proponents that can be revealed by their observed emphases of different environmental 
aspects, DEA does share some common intellectual roots with the revealed preference valuation 
approaches. Thus, the basic DEA approach is most likely to appeal those who generally prefer the 
revealed preference approach to stated preference methods. On the other hand, the DEA framework 
is technically closely related with the Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA), which is often mentioned as a 
“softer” alternative for the more traditional economic techniques. Like MCA, DEA approaches the 
valuation problem from a multi-dimensional perspective, and can be applied in combination of 
MCA or other valuation techniques that incorporate subjective judgments and stated preference 
information to the objective DEA assessment. Thus, DEA offers a flexible and general framework 
that can easily be adapted to the specific features and purposes of the application.    
 
                                                 
1Further discussion about advantages and disadvantages of the stated and the revealed preference methods can be found 
in any textbook on environmental economics, e.g. 
• Perman, R., Y. Ma, J. McGilvray, and M. Common (2003): Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, 3rd 
ed., Pearson Education. 
The purposes of this paper are two-fold. The first purpose is to introduce the key insights and the 
basic principles of DEA to people in environmental economics and related fields. DEA should be 
particularly interesting for those who are interested in environmental valuation, but are not fully 
content with the standard toolbox of valuation techniques. The usual textbook treatments of DEA2  
places great emphasis on the abstract production theoretic or technical aspects of DEA, which 
makes them somewhat difficult to access if one is not accustomed to reading abstract mathematical 
expressions. The purpose here is to provide a more readily accessible introduction to this method, 
focusing on its potential in the context of environmental performance analysis.  
 
The second purpose is to explore the possible uses of DEA in environmental valuation that extend 
beyond the traditional confinement of DEA in the comparative assessment of firm performance. We 
believe the valuation principles to which DEA is based on can offer useful insights and complement 
the conventional toolbox of environmental economists in valuation of the environmental services in 
general. To illustrate the potential, we show how DEA approach could be adjusted to the context of 
the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). In contrast to traditional DEA that focuses on comparative 
performance assessment, the purpose of environmental CBA is to identify the socially optimal 
project or a basket of projects to be implemented from a set of available alternatives. Traditional 
DEA builds on relative prices, while the absolute prices are also needed in CBA to determine 
whether any project is profitable enough to be implemented. Despite these rather fundamental 
differences, we show that DEA can be modified to the context of CBA. In some situations, DEA 
can provide a clear-cut solution for the CBA valuation problem without a need to study stated or 
revealed preferences. Even if such clear-cut solution does not arise, a preliminary DEA assessment 
can help to structure the problem as well as identify the critical parameters that need to be estimated 
by other methods, which can save a considerable amount of time and costs when implementing the 
more demanding stated or revealed preference evaluation studies.  
 
While we have tried to make the text accessible for readers lacking strong analytical skills by 
keeping the tedious technical details to the minimum, by explaining the technical material also in 
non-technical terms, and by illustrating the key results by graphical diagrams and numerical 
examples, we have also wanted to provide a sufficiently thorough treatment for those who seek an 
in-depth understanding of the method. However, we have avoided the use of elegant matrix algebra, 
which means that many of our mathematical formulas take a lot more space but are hopefully easier 
to read for those unaccustomed to reading matrix algebra. We should add that a large number of 
numerical examples are presented to facilitate better understanding of the general linear 
programming formulations. It is unnecessary to go through all numerical examples in detail, 
especially at the first reading; those are primarily offered for those who struggle with understanding 
the finer points of DEA.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a concise introduction to the 
production theoretic underpinnings of DEA, which we find important for a through understanding 
of the method. Section 3 presents the basic DEA approach in light of this production theoretic 
framework. Section 4 then introduces the environment to the traditional production theoretic setting, 
which leads us to the literature of environmental performance analysis. Sections 2-4 represent the 
current state of the art, and should be read as one entity. These sections probably appear the most 
                                                 
2 Standard textbook references include: 
• Coelli, T., D.S. Prasada Rao and G.E. Battese (1998): An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
• Cooper, W.W., L.M. Seiford and K. Tone (2000): Data Envelopment Analysis: A Comprehensive Text with Models, 
Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
• Färe, R., S. Grosskopf and C.A.K. Lovell (1994): Production Frontiers. Cambridge University Press. 
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“foreign” part of this paper for environmental economics oriented readers. Nevertheless, we chose 
to start with this production theoretic perspective to be able to proceed from the simple towards 
complex, and to better preserve the chronological order of developments in this field. The purpose 
of these sections is to summarize the current knowledge in a relatively concise but still accessible 
form. In our assessment, the most interesting (and original) material is presented in Sections 5 and 
6. Section 5 applies DEA weighting for the measurement of eco-efficiency in production. Section 6 
presents a novel DEA-based approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis. Section 6 is not very technical, and 
it may be possible to start from Section 6, or read Section 6 as an independent entity, although the 
reader will certainly benefit of understanding the more technical Sections 2-4. Section 7 presents 
brief review of the relevant literature and computational software. To keep the text readable, we 
avoid the use of references in the main text, and only provide some selected references in the 
footnotes.  
 
 
 
2. Multi-output production theory 
 
The traditional focus of DEA lies on firms3 that transform multiple inputs to multiple outputs. Since 
the microeconomics textbooks usually ignore the general multi-output setting, a brief introduction 
to the key insights of the multi-output production theory is in order.4  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the traditional setting of the production economics. A firm consumes inputs 
(e.g., labor capital, materials, energy) to produce economic outputs (i.e., goods and services). Let 
the number of inputs be L > 0 and the number of outputs be M > 0. Input usage is represented by 
vector 1 2( , , , )Lx x x=x …  and the generated outputs by vector 1 2( , , , )My y y=y … . Inputs and outputs 
are usually interpreted as flow variables (e.g. units of output per month), although capital input is 
often measured as the average stock during the time period under study. For transparency, we will 
adopt the notational convention that the upper case symbols Xk and Yk refer to the observed input 
and output quantities of firm k while the lower case symbols refer to arbitrary (or theoretical) input 
and output vectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
firm Inputs (x)     Outputs (y) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The traditional setting of production analysis 
 
 
The multi-output production theory makes extensive use of mathematical notation of set theory.5 
The most general representation of technology is the production possibility set  
                                                 
3 Hereafter, by ”firm” we refer to production units in general, without discriminating between private enterprises and 
other types of production organizations such as public sector firms and non-for-profit firms. 
4 For a more thorough (and technically demanding) presentation, see 
• Färe, R., and D. Primont (1995): Multi-Output Production and Duality: Theory and Applications, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
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(2.1) {( , ) inputs  can produce outputs }.T = x y x y  
 
This set simply lists all technically feasible combinations of inputs and outputs.6  
 
A firm k is said to be technically efficient if its input-output combination (Xk,Yk) lies on the 
boundary of set T, in other words, if it is not possible to reduce the use of any inputs without 
decreasing one of the outputs or increasing the use of another input, or conversely, if it is not 
possible to increase the amount of any output without decreasing the amount of another output or 
increasing the input usage. The classic Farrell7 output efficiency measure indicates the potential 
increase of all outputs in equal proportions, and is formally defined as  
 
(2.2) 
 = max
  ( . .)
( , ) .
k
k k
Oeff
subject to s t
T
θ
θ ∈X Y
 
 
In words, we try to maximize parameter θ , subject to the constraint that when all outputs of firm k 
are multiplied by parameter θ , the resulting output bundle can still be produced with the present 
input usage of this firm. If Oeffk is greater than one, then all outputs could be increased by factor 
Oeffk, consuming the same amounts of inputs, and hence firm k is output inefficient. If Oeffk is equal 
to one, then firm k is output efficient: it is not possible to increase all outputs without increasing the 
input usage.8  
 
An alternative way of looking at technical efficiency is to take the input perspective. The Farrell 
input efficiency measure is defined analogous to (2.2) as   
 
(2.3) 
 = min
. .
( , )
k
k k
Ieff
s t
T .
θ
θ ∈X Y
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
{5,6,7,...}B
5 A set is defined by using curly parentheses “{}”, indicating the members of the set (e.g. set A={a,b,c} consists of 
alphabets a,b,c). We can specify conditions for the membership in the set by using symbol “|”. For example, consider 
set B that includes natural numbers greater than or equal to five, i.e., =  (a set may have an infinite number 
of elements). The set of natural numbers is { }0,1,2,3,...=` . We can express B using the condition symbol “|” as  
{ 5}B x x= ∈ ≥` 5x ≥; in words, set B consists of natural numbers x, which satisfy the condition . 
6 Set T is assumed to be closed and non-empty. Moreover, it is often assumed that point (0,0) belongs to set T, which 
means that inactivity is possible. The points (0,y), y>0 are assumed to lie outside the boundaries of T, because positive 
amounts of output cannot be created from nothing. This property is known as “no free lunch”.    
7 The seminal article by Farrell presents the fundamentals of efficiency analysis in an insightful, non-technical manner, 
and is thus highly recommended reading: 
• Farrell, M. J. (1957): The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Series 
A, 120(3), 253 – 290. 
8 In the strict definition of technical efficiency, Oeff = 1 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficiency. Even if 
the Farrell measure indicates that production of all outputs cannot be increased with the given inputs, we might be able 
to increase production of some outputs, which can be interpreted as technical inefficiency as well. Efficiency concept 
implied by the Farrell measures is sometimes referred to as “weak efficiency”, while the more strict definition (due to 
Tjalling Koopmans) is known as “strong efficiency.   
 4
In this problem we multiply inputs of firm k by parameter θ  to scale down all inputs by the smallest 
possible factor, subject to the condition that these downsized inputs must still be able to produce the 
original output bundle. If Ieffk is less than one, then all inputs could be decreased by factor Ieffk, 
while maintaining the same output level, and hence firm k is input inefficient. If Ieffk is equal to one, 
then firm k is input efficient: it is not possible to increase all outputs without increasing the input 
usage. In general, the input and output efficiency measures can give different results. Färe and 
Lovell have shown that Ieffk = 1/Oeffk if and only if the production technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale (which prevail if ( , ) T∈x y  implies that also  for all values of 
parameter ).9  
( , )a a T∈x y
0a ≥
 
 
 
 x 
 y 
T 
 Yk 
O B 
firm k 
  Xk 
 
 
 A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of production possibility set T and the input and output efficiency measures 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the production possibility set T and the input and output efficiency measures in 
the simplest thinkable case of a single input and single output. The bold curved line in Figure 2 
represents the efficient frontier of the production possibility set T; set T is the area that lies below 
this curve. The point in the middle of the diagram is the input-output vector of firm k. The output 
efficiency measure Oeffk can be read from the vertical axis y as / kOeff OA Oy=  (i.e., the length of 
line segment OA divided by the length of line segment Oyk). Similarly, the input efficiency measure 
Ieffk can be read from the horizontal axis x as / kIeff OB Ox=  (i.e., the length of line segment OB 
divided by the length of line segment Oxk).   
 
The rationale for measuring efficiency as the equiproportionate decrease (increase) of all inputs 
(outputs) is not only based on the intuitive appeal of such measure; the Farrell efficiency measures 
(2.2) and (2.3) also have an attractive dual interpretation in terms of economic efficiency. Let the 
input prices be represented by vector 1 2 3( , , ,..., )x x x x xLp p p p=p  and the output prices by vector 
. Given output prices, the revenue efficiency of firm k is the ratio of 
maximum revenue obtainable by inputs of firm k to the actual observed revenue, that is, 
1 2 3( , , ,..., )y y y y yMp p p p=p
 
                                                 
9 Axiomatic analysis of efficiency indices  
• Färe, R., and C. A. K. Lovell (1978): Measuring the Technical Efficiency of Production, Journal of Economic 
Theory 19, 150-162. 
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(2.4) Reffk = 1 1 2 2
'
1 1 2 2
...
max   s.t. ( , ')
...
y y yM M
k
y k y k yM kM
p y p y p y
T
p Y p Y p Y
′ ′ ′+ + + ∈+ + +y X y . 
 
The elements of output vector y’ are the unknown variables of this problem. Output vector y’ 
should maximize the revenue of firm k at the given output prices, and must be producible with the 
given inputs Xk. The score of revenue efficiency Reffk can be interpreted in the same way as output 
efficiency measure; a value of one means that firm k is revenue efficient, and a value greater than 
one indicates the degree of revenue inefficiency.    
 
Similarly, given input prices, cost efficiency of firm k is the ratio of minimum cost of producing the 
output of firm k to the actual observed cost, that is, 
 
(2.5) Ceffk = 1 1 2 2
'
1 1 2 2
...min   s.t. ( ', )
...
x x xL L
k
x k x k xL kL
p x p x p x T
p X p X p X
′ ′ ′+ + + ∈+ + +x x Y . 
 
Cost efficiency measure is bounded by zero and one; it attains a value of one for the cost efficient 
firm, and a value less than one for the cost inefficient firm.   
 
It can be shown that if the production possibility set T satisfies free disposability and convexity (the 
meaning of which will be elaborated in the next paragraph), then the output efficiency measure can 
be interpreted as revenue efficiency at the ‘most favorable’ prices (which minimize the revenue 
efficiency measure) for firm k.10 Specifically,  
 
(2.6) Oeffk = Reffk. min
yp
 
Similarly, the input efficiency can be interpreted as cost efficiency at the ‘most favorable’ input 
prices (which maximize the cost efficiency measure) for firm k. Specifically,  
 
(2.7) Ieffk = Ceffk. max
xp
 
Free disposability means that, given inputs x, it is possible to decrease the production of any output 
by any desired amount (i.e., get rid off any excess output free of charge), or conversely, it is 
possible to produce a given output y with more input resources than is absolutely necessary. More 
specifically, free disposability means that if ( , ) T∈x y  and  then also ' , '≥ ≤x x y y ( ', ') T∈x y . 
Since the free disposability assumption is of particular importance for the environmental 
performance analysis, we will devote further attention on this property as we proceed.  
 
Convexity means that it is possible to combine firms: if we observe firms A and B, it is possible to 
take a half of both firms and produce the average output of these firms by the average input 
consumption (consider e.g. a merger of two companies). Since convexity is not as interesting an 
assumption as free disposability, for simplicity, we will follow the usual approach and take it as a 
maintained assumption.11  
 
                                                 
10 If these assumptions fail to hold, then equalities (2.6) and (2.7) become inequalities (i.e., replace ”=” by ”≤”).  
11 The convexity assumption has attracted a lot of debate in the recent DEA literature, see e.g. 
• Cherchye, L., T. Kuosmanen, and G.T. Post (2000): What Is The Economic Meaning of FDH? A Reply to 
Thrall, Journal of Productivity Analysis 13(3), 259-263. 
• Kuosmanen, T. (2001): DEA with Efficiency Classification Preserving Conditional Convexity, European 
Journal of Operational Research 132(2), 83-99. 
 6
Alternatively interpreted, free disposability can be seen as a first-order curvature condition for the 
efficient frontier: the maximum output does not decrease if input usage increases (i.e., the marginal 
product of every input is non-negative). Convexity can be seen as the second-order condition: the 
maximum output increases at non-increasing rate as the inputs increases (i.e., the marginal product 
of every input is non-increasing). 
 
The most favorable prices  and  are referred to as “shadow prices” or the “benefit-of-the-
doubt” prices. If we are interested of economic efficiency but price information is unavailable, then 
we can use the Farrell technical efficiency measures to estimate conservative lower or upper bounds 
for economic efficiency.12 These shadow prices can be also used for the valuation of environmental 
impacts and pressures as will be demonstrated in Sections 4, 5, and 6 below. 
*
xp
*
yp
 
 
 
3. DEA efficiency analysis 
 
This section introduces the traditional DEA analysis in the production economic setting discussed in 
the previous section. Thus far we have discussed about production possibility set T as if it was 
known to us. In practice, set T is usually estimated from the empirical input-output data. DEA has 
originally emerged as an approach for estimating T. The principle of DEA is to make minimal prior 
assumptions about the shape of T, and rather let the data ‘speak for themselves’. 
 
DEA is based on the comparison of a sample of N firms that are assumed to utilize the same 
production technology T. The critical assumption that almost all DEA studies make is that all 
relevant inputs and outputs are observed for all firms without error. Thus, all observed input-output 
vectors must be contained in T, otherwise they could not be observed to begin with. Other typical 
assumptions are free disposability and convexity introduced above.  
 
Imposing the assumptions of free disposability and convexity (alternative sets of assumptions are 
also possible but we here restrict to the most standard ones), then DEA approximates the production 
possibility set T by the following set 
 
(3.1) 
1 1 1
ˆ ( , ) ; ; 1; 0
N N N
DEA
n n n n n n
n n n
T λ λ λ λ
= = =
⎧ ⎫= ≥ × ≤ × = ≥⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ ∑x y x X y Y . 
 
This set satisfies the so-called minimum extrapolation principle, being the smallest set that contains 
all observed firms and satisfies the maintained assumptions of free disposability and convexity. 
Thus, the DEA production set (3.1) gives a conservative estimate of the true production possibilities 
T, (i.e., ).  ˆ DEAT T⊆
 
Firm-specific efficiency measures are calculated relative to DEA technology by solving a linear 
programming problem.13 DEA output efficiency of firm k is obtained as the optimal solution to 
problem 
                                                 
12 For further details, see  
• Kuosmanen, T., and G.T. Post (2001): Measuring Economic Efficiency with Incomplete Price information: 
With an Application to European Commercial Banks, European Journal of Operational Research 134, 43-58. 
13 Linear programming problem is characterized by a linear objective function (to be minimized or maximized) and a 
system of linear constraints. A classic text on linear programming (written by economists for economists) is 
• Dorfmann R., P.A. Samuelson and R. Solow (1958): Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, McGraw 
Hill. 
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 (3.2) 
,
1 11 1 21 2 1
2 12 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 11 1 21 2 1
2 12 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
max
.
...
...
...     
...
...     
...
k
k N N
k N N
kM M M NM N
k N N
k N N
kL L L NL N
Oeff
s t
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y outputs
Y Y Y Y
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
θ λ θ
θ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
=
⎫⎪≤ + + + ⎪⎪≤ + + + ⎬⎪⎪≤ + + + ⎪⎭
≥ + + + ⎫⎪≥ + + + ⎪⎬
≥ + + + ⎭
#
#
1 2 ... 1                           
0 1,..., .
N
k
inputs
weights
k N
λ λ λ
λ
⎪⎪
+ + + = ⎫⎬≥ ∀ = ⎭
   
 
These problems are too complicated to solve analytically (i.e., by paper and pen) but standard PC 
equipped with widely available software will solve even a large problem in a split second. We 
return to the interpretation of this formulation shortly. But before that, let us also introduce the 
linear programming formulation for the input efficiency: 
 
 
(3.3) 
,
1 11 1 21 2 1
2 12 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 11 1 21 2 1
2 12 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
max
. .
...
...
...         
...
...
...     
k
k N N
k N N
kM M M NM N
k N N
k N N
kL L L NL N
Ieff
s t
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
outputs
Y Y Y Y
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
θ λ θ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ
=
≤ + + + ⎫⎪≤ + + + ⎪⎬⎪⎪≤ + + + ⎭
≥ + + + ⎫
≥ + + + ⎬
≥ + + +
#
#
1 2 ... 1                             
0 1,..., .
N
k
inputs
weights
k N
λ λ λ
λ
⎪⎪
⎪⎪⎭
+ + + = ⎫⎬≥ ∀ = ⎭
 
 
 
In both these problems, the first set of M constraints run through all outputs (as indicated on the 
right), the second set of L constraints run through all inputs. The right-hand sides of the first M+L 
constraints form linear combinations of the observed input and output quantities. This effectively 
represents the production possibilities (compare with (3.1)). Observe that these right-hand sides are 
exactly the same for the both output and input efficiency formulations. The difference of orientation 
reveals itself on the left-hand sides of these constraints. In the output efficiency problem we try to 
increase all outputs of firm k by the same factorθ . In the input efficiency problem we try to reduce 
all inputs of firm k by factor θ .  
 8
 
The assumption of free disposability reveals itself in problems (3.2) and (3.3) in the form of 
inequality constraints for inputs and outputs: not all of these constraints have to be binding in the 
optimal solution. The assumption of free disposability could be easily relaxed in problems (3.2) and 
(3.3) by replacing the inequality signs of the input and output constraints by equalities (=).  
 
Like all linear programming problems, problems (3.2) and (3.3) have equivalent dual formulations. 
We can calculate the efficiency measures equivalently by solving the following linear programming 
problems: 
 
(3.4) 
1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ, ,
11 1 12 2 1 11 1 12 2 1
21 1 22 2 2 21 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆmin ...
. .
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ... ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ... ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ( ...
x y
k k x k x kL xLf
y y M yM x x L xL
y y M yM x x L xL
N y N y
Oeff X p X p X p f
s t
Y p Y p Y p X p X p X p f
Y p Y p Y p X p X p X p f
Y p Y p Y
= + + + +
+ + + − + + + + ≤
+ + + − + + + + ≤
+ + +
p p
#
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 1                                                                   
ˆ ˆ, 0.
NM yM N x N x NL xL
k y k y kM yM
x y
firms
p X p X p X p f
Y p Y p Y p
prices
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪− + + + + ≤ ⎭
+ + + = ⎫⎪⎬≥ ⎪⎭p p
  
 
 
(3.5) 
1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ, ,
11 1 12 2 1 11 1 12 2 1
21 1 22 2 2 21 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆmax ...
. .
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ... ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ... ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ( ...
x y
k k y k y kM yMf
y y M yM x x L xL
y y M yM x x L xL
N y N y
Ieff Y p Y p Y p f
s t
Y p Y p Y p f X p X p X p
Y p Y p Y p f X p X p X p
Y p Y p Y
= + + + +
+ + + + − + + + ≤
+ + + + − + + + ≤
+ + +
p p
#
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ) ( ... ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 1                                                                
ˆ ˆ, 0.
NM yM N x N x NL xL
k x k x kL xL
x y
firms
p f X p X p X p
X p X p X p
prices
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪+ − + + + ≤ ⎭
+ + + = ⎫⎪⎬≥ ⎪⎭p p
 
  
 
Observe that, in contrast with the standard problem of the firm, in this efficiency evaluation 
problem the input and output quantities are known parameters, while the shadow prices  and 
the fixed cost/benefit (f) are unknown variables. In problem (3.4) the objective is to set the prices 
such that the total cost of firm k is minimized. The N firm-specific constraints impose that all firms 
make a nonpositive profit. The output prices are normalized such that the revenue of firm k is one. 
If we compare this with the general economic efficiency interpretation of the output efficiency 
measure given in (2.6), we can interpret the optimal solution as revenue efficiency of firm k at the 
most favorable prices for firm k. Analogous interpretation applies to input efficiency problem (3.5), 
where the total cost of firm k appears in the price normalization constraint, and the total revenue is 
taken to the objective function.  
,ˆ ˆ( )x yp p
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It is important to note that in both these problems the shadow prices should be interpreted as 
relative values of inputs and outputs, not absolute prices. The inequality constraints essentially 
normalize the prices such that the efficiency measure can be read directly from the optimal solution. 
 
In problems (3.4) and (3.5) the free disposability assumption is enforced by the non-negativity 
constraint for prices . From economic perspective, free disposability can be interpreted as the 
requirement that input usage incurs an outflow of funds and the output production yields an inflow 
of funds to the firm. Relaxation of free disposability means that prices can become negative.  
,ˆ ˆx yp p
 
To illustrate the DEA approach, we consider a simple numerical example involving four firms 
labeled as A, B, C, and D, which produce a single output using two inputs. The input and output 
data of these firms are reported by Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Numerical example with four firms, a single output and two inputs 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D 
Y 8 3 5 5 
X1 5 1 4 3,5 
X2 6 4 1 3,5 
  
 
Consider input efficiency of Firm D. Problem (3.3) can be written in this example as 
 
(3.6) }
,
max
. .
5 8 3 5 5         
3.5 5 1 4 3.5
3.5 6 4 1 3.5
1                
, , , 0.
D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
Ieff
s t
output
inputs
weights
θ λ θ
λ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
=
≤ + + +
≥ + + + ⎫⎬≥ + + + ⎭
+ + + = ⎫⎬≥ ⎭
 
 
Similarly, problem (3.5) reads  
 
(3.7) 
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
ˆmax 5
. .
ˆ ˆ ˆ(8 ) (5 6 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(3 ) (1 4 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (4 1 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (3.5 3.5 ) 0
ˆ ˆ3.5 3.5 1                      
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , 0
y x x
D yp p p f
y x x
y x x
y x x
y x x
x x
y x x
Ieff p f
s t
p f p p
p f p p
firms
p f p p
p f p p
p p
p p p
= +
+ − + ≤ ⎫⎪+ − + ≤ ⎪⎬+ − + ≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎭
+ =
≥ . prices
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
 
 
The optimal solutions to both problems give 0.9121, which means that firm D could reduce both its 
inputs by 8.79 percent and produce five units of outputs by using 3.192 units of both inputs. 
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Problem (3.6) finds this reduction potential by assigning weights *Aλ  = 0.23, *Bλ  = 0.35, *Cλ  =0.42, 
and *Dλ  = 0. The optimal prices of the dual problem (3.7) are , and 
 
* * *
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Figure 3: Isoquant map of the numerical example 
 
The example is further illustrated graphically by means of an isoquant map in Figure 3. The 
horizontal axis represents the quantity of input 1 and the vertical axis represents the quantity of 
input 2. Points A,B,C,D indicate the input usage of the corresponding firm. Triangle ABC 
represents the efficient frontier of production possibility set ˆ DEAT , as seen from above from the bird 
perspective. The isoquant map can be read like an ordinary map. The isoquant lines (i.e., isoq(.)) 
indicate all input combinations that can produce (according to the DEA model) the indicated output 
quantity. Point B lies at the lowest level (i.e., firm B produces the smallest amount of output), point 
A lies on the top of the hill. Since points A, B, and C lie on the isoquants corresponding to the 
output level of the firm, these firms are all technically efficient. Firm D lies above the input 
isoquant associated with output level of five. This means that firm D uses an excessive amount of 
inputs to produce its output and is hence inefficient. Technical efficiency is measured by decreasing 
both inputs in the same proportions: we move along the broken line from point D towards the 
origin, until we hit the isoquant line of five units of output and thus achieve full efficiency.   
 
Now that we have a basic understanding about the DEA methodology, we are ready to proceed to 
environmental applications.  
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4. Environmental Performance Analysis 
 
The literature of environmental performance (or environmental efficiency) analysis is closely 
oriented towards production theory and the intellectual roots of DEA. Most environmental 
applications of DEA adhere to this perspective, which basically just integrates the undesirable 
outputs into this classic Farrell framework of efficiency analysis. This extension is thematically 
illustrated by Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
 
Waste (w) 
 
 
 
 
firm 
 
 
 
Inputs (x)     Outputs (y)   
 
 
 
Figure 4: The basic setting of environmental efficiency analysis 
 
 
It is straightforward to redefine the production technology T such that it takes into account the 
undesirable side-products and side-effects of production, including the generation of (non-recycled) 
solid waste, emission of substances to air and water, as well as non-material undesirable outputs 
such as noise, in addition to solid waste. For brevity, we shall refer to all these undesirable side-
effects by “waste”, and denote the quantities of these detrimental variables by vector w. Integrating 
waste in the production theory, we redefine the production possibility set as 
 
(4.1) {( , , ) inputs  can produce outputs  and waste }ENVT = x w y x y w . 
 
The usual approach is then to measure environmental performance of the firm as a distance to the 
environmental technology TENV. There are many different ways of measuring the distance to the 
frontier, as illustrated by Table 2. Some authors consider reduction of waste, keeping the inputs and 
outputs constant; others reduce waste and inputs simultaneously, keeping the outputs constant. Also 
simultaneous changes in all variables have been considered, by means of the so-called hyperbolic 
and directional distance function measures. In the directional distance function approach we need to 
choose a pre-determined direction, represented by vectors ( , , )x w yg g g , along which the firms move 
towards the efficient frontier.14 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For further details, see e.g. 
• Färe, R., and S. Grosskopf (2004): New Directions: Efficiency and Productivity, Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
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Table 2: Alternative orientations for environmental performance measurement  
Orientation of measurement Formal expression 
Environmental min   s.t. ( , , ) ENVTθ θ ∈x w y  
Input-environmental min   s.t. ( , , ) ENVTθ θ θ ∈x w y  
Output-environmental min   s.t.θ ( , , / )θ θx w y ENVT∈  
Hyperbolic min   s.t.θ ( , , / )θ θ θx w y ENVT∈  
Directional min   s.t.θ ( , , )yx wθ θ θ− − +x g w g y g ENVT∈  
 
 
The choice of the efficiency measure essentially depends on the purposes of the application. As a 
rule of thumb, it is advisable to take variables that the firms cannot influence as given constants, 
and increase or decrease those variables that are under direct control of the firm. While the 
directional distance function approach is very general, the interpretation of the resulting efficiency 
measure can be difficult. Of course, it is also possible to report multiple complementary efficiency 
indicators. 
 
As for the DEA estimation of the efficient frontier, the linear programming approach easily extends 
to the more general case that takes into account waste variables w. However, the specific treatment 
of waste as either input or output has attracted considerable debate in this literature. Perhaps the 
most traditional approach is to model waste (technically) as an input, because both waste and inputs 
incur costs for the firm, and hence the firm generally tries to avoid the excessive consumption of 
inputs and the generation of waste.15 Other authors have argued that waste is technically an output, 
and hence should be modeled as such. Of course, standard treatment of outputs does not apply. As 
an answer to this problem, an alternative property of weak disposability has been suggested.16  
 
Suppose we treat waste as inputs, then free disposability means that if  and 
 then also
( , , ) ENVT∈x w y
' , ' , '≥ ≥ ≤x x w w y y ( ', ', ') T∈x w y . The free disposability condition for waste w is not 
physically realistic because it implies that a finite quantity of input x could (in theory) produce an 
infinite amount of waste. (Yet, from the economic perspective this need not be a problem as we will 
argue below.) The alternative weak disposability property is formally defined as follows: if 
 and 0 , then ( . In words, it is possible to reduce the original 
activity level by factor d, which simultaneously reduces both outputs and waste by that factor. We 
next illustrate the difference between the free versus weak disposability perspectives by means of a 
numerical example.  
( , , ) ENVT∈x w y 1
                                                
d≤ ≤ , , ) ENVd d T∈x w y
 
Since there are a large number of different approaches for measuring environmental performance, 
and the modifications to the standard DEA formulations are relatively straightforward, we do not 
present general formulations for the environmental performance measurement but merely illustrate 
the difference between the use of waste as input and the weak disposability approaches by means of 
numerical examples. To allow for comparison with Section 3, let us simply modify the previous 
numerical example involving firms A, B, C, and D such that output 2 of the previous example is 
considered to be waste, and the same numerical values apply. Table 3 summarizes the data set.  
 
15 See e.g.: 
• Cropper, M.L. and W.E. Oates (1992): Environmental Economics: A Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 30, 
675-740. 
• Hailu, A. and T.S. Veeman (2001): Non-Parametric Productivity Analysis with Undesirable Outputs: An 
Application to the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83, 605-616. 
16 The most notable proponents of the weak disposability approach are Rolf Färe and Shawna Grosskopf, see e.g.: 
• Färe, R., and S. Grosskopf (2004): New Directions: Efficiency and Productivity, Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
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Table 3: Numerical example with four firms, a single output, a single input and a single waste 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D 
Y 8 3 5 5 
X 5 1 4 3,5 
W 6 4 1 3,5 
  
 
We will focus on the case of environmental efficiency measure that minimizes the amount of waste 
at the given level of inputs and outputs (i.e., ). Let us first consider that 
traditional approach of treating the waste as an input. In this case, the DEA distance function 
problem becomes 
min   s.t. ( , , ) ENVTθ θ ∈x w y
  
(4.2) 
}
}
}
,
max
. .
5 8 3 5 5         
3.5 5 1 4 3.5   
3.5 6 4 1 3.5
1                
, , , 0
D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
ENVeff
s t
output
input
waste
weights
θ λ θ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
=
≤ + + +
≥ + + +
≥ + + +
+ + + = ⎫⎬≥ ⎭
 
 
This is identical to problem (3.6) above, except that we now only decrease the amount of waste by 
factor θ , keeping the input at its current level. The dual pricing problem becomes 
  
(4.3) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
ˆ ˆmax 5 3.5
. .
ˆ ˆ ˆ(8 ) (5 6 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(3 ) (1 4 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (4 1 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (3.5 3.5 ) 0
ˆ3.5 1                                  
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,
y x w
D yp p p f
y x w
y x w
y x w
y x w
w
y x w
ENVeff p f p
s t
p f p p
x
p f p p firms
p f p p
p f p p
p
p p p
= + −
⎫⎪+ − + ≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎬⎪+ − + ≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎭
=
0
prices
⎫⎬≥ ⎭
 
 
The only difference to the DEA problem (3.7) is that we shift of the input cost ˆ3.5 xp  from the price 
normalization constraint to the objective function. 
 
The optimal solutions to both problems are equal to 0.6735, meaning that firm D could reduce its 
waste by 32.65 percent to 2.357 units and produce five units of outputs by using 3.5 units of input. 
Problem (4.2) finds this reduction potential by assigning weights *Aλ  = 0.14, *Bλ  = 0.21, *Cλ  =0.64, 
and *Dλ  = 0.  
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Figure 5 illustrate the case by means of the input-waste isoquant map. Notice that the isoquants 
identical to those of Figure 3, and thus the efficiency status of every firm remains the unchanged. 
The only difference lies in the direction of measurement. We now only decrease amount of waste 
generated by the inefficient firm D, keeping the input level fixed. Thus, we move from point D 
downwards towards the x axis, until we reach the isoquant corresponding to output level of five 
units.  
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Figure 5: Isoquant map of the numerical example 
 
The isoquants illustrate the theoretical problem with free disposability: a finite amount of input 
could generate an infinite amount of waste, which is a physical impossibility. In practice, however, 
this hardly matters because we are usually interested of decreasing the amount of waste anyway. 
Whatever happens at the backward bending part of the true isoquant is not economically very 
interesting. 
 
Let us next consider the alternative approach of treating the waste as an output by assuming weak 
disposability. Since the DEA production set is in mathematical sense a convex closure of its 
extreme points, the simplest and the most effective way of implementing the weak disposability is 
to add to the data set the new extreme points that arise if the firms would exploit the weak 
disposability property.17 For example, firm A, could ultimately stop the production, that is, use five 
units input to produce zero units of waste and zero units of output. Let us label this “inactive” 
variant of firm A by lower case a. Similarly, the inactive reincarnations of firms B, C and D that 
dispose the inputs and produce nothing are labeled as b, c and d, respectively. Introducing these 
inactive pseudo-firms, our DEA model becomes   
 
 
17 To the best of our knowledge, the inactive firms have not been taken into account in this literature before. The DEA 
formulations which build on the weak disposability property usually only relax the free disposability condition, but fail 
to exploit the weak disposability assumption in full. 
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(4.4) 
}
}
}
,
max
. .
5 8 3 5 5 +0 0 0 0         
3.5 5 1 4 3.5 +5 1 4 3.5
3.5 6 4 1 3.5 +0 0 0 0
+ 1                       
, ,
A B C D a b c d
A B C D a b c d
A B C D a b c d
A B C D a b c d
A B
s t
output
input
waste
θ θ
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
θ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
≤ + + + + + +
≥ + + + + + +
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
λ
, , , , , 0.C D a b c d
weightsλ λ λ λ λ
⎫⎬≥ ⎭
 
 
Note that free disposability of waste is now eliminated by writing the waste constraint in equality 
form. The opportunities for weak disposability are accounted for by taking convex combinations of 
both existing, observed firms and inactive pseudo-firms. These are the two key differences between 
formulations (4.2) and (4.4). 
 
The dual pricing problem is simply obtained by introducing the inactive firms in problem (4.3), 
specifically: 
   
(4.5) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
ˆ ˆmax 5 3.5
. .
ˆ ˆ ˆ(8 ) (5 6 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(3 ) (1 4 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (4 1 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(5 ) (3.5 3.5 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(0 ) (5 0 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(0 ) (1 0 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(0 ) (4 0
y x w
y xp p p f
y x w
y x w
y x w
y x w
y x w
y x w
y x
p f p
s t
p f p p
p f p p firms
p f p p
p f p p
p f p p
p f p p
p f p
+ −
⎫⎪+ − + ≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎬⎪+ − + ≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎭
+ − + ≤
+ − + ≤
+ − + ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ(0 ) (3.5 0 ) 0  
ˆ3.5 1                                  
ˆ ˆ, 0.
w
y x w
w
y x
inactive
p firms
p f p p
p
prices
p p
⎫⎪⎪⎬≤ ⎪⎪+ − + ≤ ⎭
= ⎫⎪⎬≥ ⎪⎭
 
 
The two key differences between problems (4.3) and (4.5) are the introduction of inactive firms to 
the production possibility set and the relaxation of the non-negativity constraint for the price of 
waste. In general, prices of some waste variables can now be negative, but the total cost of waste 
must still add up to one. Since here we have only one waste, the relaxation of the non-negativity 
constraint does not have any effect, which confirms the earlier conclusion that when efficiency is 
measured in terms of waste reduction, the free disposability assumption is not that restrictive after 
all. 
 
Numerical calculations verify that the input efficiency does not change for any of these four firms 
when weak disposability of waste is assumed. This, however, is not a general result. Let us compare 
the input-waste isoquant map of Figure 5 with the map that is based on weak disposability, as 
presented in Figure 6. Introducing the inactive firm b, we get a new efficient frontier segment 
represented by triangle bBC. This changes the shape of all isoquants corresponding to output levels 
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of less than five units. For firm D there is no effect since it operates at the output level of five units; 
the weak disposability would have an effect on efficiency of firm D if it produced less than five 
units of output. The other obvious difference between Figures 5 and 6 is that in Figure 6 the 
isoquants do not raise up to infinity, but stop after the line-segment AB, continuing horizontally 
under the frontier towards infinite input levels (as free disposability of inputs is still assumed). (To 
keep the figure readable, the horizontal segments of isoquants that fall below the frontier are 
omitted.) It should also be noted that any combinations between points a and A, d and D, and c and 
C are also technically feasible. We have not connected these points by lines simply because these 
lines lie in the interior of the production possibility set (as line aA) or do not contribute to reshaping 
the frontier (as line cC).      
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Figure 6: Isoquant map of weakly disposable DEA technology 
 
 
Observe that the environmental performance analysis defines efficiency in purely technical terms, 
without taking any reallocation possibilities into account. The efficiency measures considered thus 
far only capture the waste reduction potential which can be achieved virtually free of charge by 
improving operational efficiency. These measures do not necessarily measure how 
“environmentally friendly” the firms are. For example, firm B that produces a relatively large 
amount of waste per unit of output is considered to be efficient, since reduction of waste would 
require further input usage and thus increase the costs for the firm. Still, firm B can hardly be 
viewed as an environmentally friendly company; saving inputs is not a valid excuse for polluting 
the environment. By these observations, we next turn to applying the DEA tools to eco-efficiency 
analysis. 
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5. Eco-efficiency analysis 
 
Environmental sustainability is a widely acknowledged as major challenge for today’s world. 
However, making transparent decisions on development and investment with an optimal balance for 
economy, ecology and social development is not self-evident. The concept of sustainability is so 
vaguely defined that no sound, generally accepted operational methods for quantifying 
sustainability currently exist. Therefore, it seems practical to focus on quantifying more narrowly 
confined components of sustainability. Ecological efficiency or eco-efficiency is one such 
component. 
 
Eco-efficiency is usually defined as the ratio of economic value added to the index of 
environmental pressures:   
 
(5.1)   - .
 
Economic value addedEco efficiency
Environmental pressures
=  
 
Before we can measure this ratio, we have to take a more detailed look at the numerator and the 
denominator of this ratio.  
 
Let us remain in the context of production, as in previous sections. For firm k, the economic value 
added Vk is simply the profit: 
 
(5.2) . 
1 1
M L
y x
k km km kl
m l
V p Y p X
= =
= −∑ ∑ kl
 
Note that economic value added encompasses the technical efficiency of producing maximal output 
with given inputs, as well as allocative or economic efficiency of producing the right mix of outputs 
with the least expensive combination of inputs. While traditional DEA analysis is typically focused 
on situations where input-output prices are unknown, we here assume that the total value added is 
known for all firms in the sample, even if the specific prices might be unknown to the analyst. More 
detailed data of individual inputs and outputs (or their prices), as assumed in standard DEA, is 
unnecessary in this section.   
 
As for the denominator of (5.1), we will deviate from most DEA approaches in that we focus on 
environmental pressures rather than specific undesirable outputs per se. Undesirable outputs of 
production might include air emissions such as carbon-dioxide and methane. Both these emissions 
contribute to the same environmental problem: the green house effect. Numerous studies have 
investigated the effects of different green house gases, and conversion factors are available for 
translating the amounts of different green house gases into carbon-dioxide equivalents. Since we are 
ultimately concerned about the green house effect rather than the amount of carbon-dioxide in the 
atmosphere per se, and since different green house gases can be aggregated based on scientifically 
sound conversion factors, we believe it is most appropriate to use aggregated measures of 
environmental themes such as climate change as inputs for the eco-efficiency analysis. 
 
The aggregated carbon-dioxide equivalents do not adequately capture the environmental impact, 
measured by the social costs of climate change. Rather, such measures only represent the pressure 
on the ecosystem. To a certain extent, the forests are capable of sequestrating the extra carbon-
dioxide emitted to the atmosphere. The problem occurs when the green house gas emissions exceed 
the carrying capacity of the ecosystem, and extra carbon-dioxide stocks start to accumulate causing 
drastic, unpredictable changes in climate conditions. The relationship between the environmental 
pressure and the environmental impact is often complex, nonlinear, and difficult to predict. 
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Moreover, it seems practically impossible to attribute the effects of climate change (such as loss of 
life due to heavy storms or flooding) to specific firms that have emitted a certain amount of green 
house gases. Therefore, we do not attempt to measure the ultimate environmental impacts, but find 
it most appropriate to work at the level of environmental pressures.  
    
The most significant problem in eco-efficiency measurement concerns the aggregation of various 
environmental pressures. Like in the case of green house gases, we believe that it is often possible 
and meaningful to aggregate individual pollutants that contribute to the same environmental theme 
in the same aggregate measure for the overall environmental pressure using some a priori 
conversion factors. By contrast, pressures on different environmental themes referring to different 
types of environmental deterioration or resource depletion are incommensurable, meaning that these 
effects that cannot be aggregated unanimously by using objective conversion factors. 
 
To illustrate the relationship between “environmental pressures” and “pollutants”, consider the main 
environmental pressures due to road transportation listed in Table 4. Some environmental effects of 
road transportation (e.g. dispersion of particles) are directly measurable by a single indicator, while 
other effects (e.g. climate change, acidification) are influenced by several emissions. To assess a 
given effect, different undesirable outputs arising in the production activity can often be aggregated 
by using well-defined conversion factors. For example, different types of air emissions contribute to 
the climate change, but their effects can be fairly accurately summarized by converting different 
emissions to CO2 equivalents. By contrast, there is no unambiguous way of summarizing all the 
different environmental pressures in a single overall environmental index. For example, we cannot 
simply add green-house gases measured in CO2 equivalents to particle emissions measured in tons 
of TPM. Moreover, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to express some generally accepted 
weights that would reflect the relative importance of the effects. While this example pertains to the 
case of road transportation, which in industrialized countries is one of the main sources of air 
emissions, the similar type of aggregation possibilities and problems are faced equally well in other 
industries and at all levels of aggregation.  
 
 
Table 4: The main environmental pressures due to road transportation 
Environmental pressure Specific emission /resource Unit of measurement 
Climate change CO2, CH4, N2O, CO CO2 equivalents 
Acidification NOx, SO2 acid equivalents 
Smog formation HC tons of HC 
Dispersion of particles TPM  tons of TPM 
Degradation of natural resources Oil tons of gasoline 
Noise Urban noise level dB 
 
 
To overcome this incommensurability problem, we propose to apply the DEA approach. To this 
end, it is necessary to introduce some notation. Suppose the production activity under consideration 
induces R different environmental pressures, the severity of which is measured by variables z = (z1 
… zR). For simplicity, all environmental pressures are assumed to be harmful (i.e., z  0). We will 
assume that these pressures can be unambiguously quantified, and the pressures caused by firm k 
can be numerically represented by vector 
≥
( 1k k kRZ Z )′=Z … . As before, we shall refer to observed 
data for firms by capital symbols Vk, Zk, and reserve the lower case symbols v, and z for arbitrary 
(theoretical) values. 
 
Even though we do not observe prices for these environmental pressures, those prices do exist (in 
Platonian world of ideas). These unknown prices are defined as the marginal social cost of the 
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impact, and are represented by the vector ( 1,..., Rp p )′=p . The problem of how to estimate the 
unknown unobservable prices p has been one of the key issues in environmental economics. We 
here deviate from the conventional approaches in that we do not try to “parameterize” the prices 
based on stated or revealed preferences, but instead, treat the prices as model variables as in 
standard DEA. 
 
Given the more precise notation, eco-efficiency ratio (5.1) can now be formally expressed in 
absolute terms as 
  
(5.3) 
1
k
k R
r kr
r
VEE
p Z
=
≡
∑
. 
 
Note that this absolute value is not very informative as such: if eco-efficiency of firm k is 3.67, then 
how should we interpret that? Is firm k environmentally friendly or not? To interpret the eco-
efficiency score, we have to compare it with the best performers in the sector. To this end, we 
introduce the notion of relative eco-efficiency as the ratio of eco-efficiency measure (5.3) to the 
maximum observed eco-efficiency in the sample, formally defined as 
 
(5.4)  
{ }1,...,
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k
nn N
EEE E
EE
∈
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Now we are ready to apply the DEA tools for the pricing of the environmental pressures. We may 
normalize prices p such that the maximum eco-efficiency ratio becomes equal to unity. Applying 
the DEA weighting, we obtain the following optimization problem 
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The objective function is the eco-efficiency measure of firm k at the normalized prices . Observe 
that the price normalization does not change the relative eco-efficiency measure (5.4). If both the 
numerator and denominator change by factor g, then these changes cancel out as we take the ratio of 
the two. The first N constraints guarantee that the eco-efficiency measures of all N firms in the 
sample must be less than or equal to one. Thus, the objective function directly indicates the value of 
relative eco-efficiency. Like in traditional DEA, the valuation is based on the most favorable prices 
for firm k; prices that maximize the eco-efficiency ratio. If this “benefit-of-the-doubt” eco-
efficiency ratio is low, then we can be sure that the ‘true’ eco-efficiency (in terms of unknown 
pˆ
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prices p) must be even lower. If this eco-efficiency ratio is high, however, it does not necessarily 
guarantee that the true efficiency is high. 
 
The technical difficulty with problem (5.5) is that it now includes ratios (or fractions) both in the 
objective function and in the constraints. The problem is thus nonlinear with regard to shadow 
prices, which makes it computationally demanding. However, this difficulty is easily eliminated by 
solving the reciprocal (or inverse) problem (exploiting the fact that economic benefits Vk are simply 
given constants): 
   
(5.6) 
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The eco-efficiency measure  is obtained by taking the inverse of the optimal solution to (5.6). 
This measure has a clear interpretation as a degree of efficiency: the value of  lies between 
zero and one, and the higher the value, the more eco-efficient the firm. The result 
n/ kE E
n/ kE E
n/ kE E  = 1 
implies the best eco-efficiency in the sample.  
 
In analogy with the previous DEA formulations, also (5.6) has an equivalent dual formulation, 
which can be written as 
 
(5.7) 
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It is illustrative to compare this linear programming problem with the input oriented DEA problem 
(3.3) discussed in Section 3. From technical point of view, we can interpret (5.7) as the standard 
DEA input efficiency problem which uses environmental pressures as inputs and economic value 
added as output. The only technical difference we observe is the fact that weights  are required to 
sum to one in (3.3) but not in (5.7). This means that the size of the firm, measured by absolute 
levels of value added and environmental pressures, does not matter in eco-efficiency problem (5.7); 
λ
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we are only interested about the ratio of the value added to the environmental pressure. In DEA 
literature (5.7) is interpreted as a constant returns to scale model. 
 
Notwithstanding these technical similarities, the economic interpretation of (5.7) bears many 
important differences to standard DEA as well as to its applications to environmental performance 
analysis. Firstly, this measure does not only capture differences in operational efficiency across 
firms, it also captures allocative efficiencies – how valuable the goods produced and the inputs 
consumed are at the market. Secondly, the severity of different emissions is accounted for by 
aggregating emissions that contribute to environmental theme r into the pressure indicator zr based 
on scientifically sound conversion factors. Thus, our measure accounts not only the quantity of 
emissions but also their quality. Thirdly, the DEA weighting is here applied not to the technical 
problem of estimating the production possibility frontier, but the economic problem of finding 
prices for the environmental pressures. Although we can construct a set of feasible (z,v) 
combinations and measure efficiency as a distance to the frontier of that set, the mathematical 
structure of problem (5.7) does not arise from technical assumptions concerning the shape of that 
set. The constant returns to scale property of that set is not imposed by assumption; it arises from 
the definition of eco-efficiency as a ratio in (5.1). Convexity is not imposed by assumption; it arises 
from the economic structure of our environmental damage indicator defined as the economic cost of 
environmental pressure (i.e., using  in (5.3)). Finally, free disposability is not imposed; it 
follows from the assumption that every environmental pressure has a non-negative economic cost 
(i.e., ).   
1
R
r kr
r
p Z
=
∑
0≥p
 
Let us illustrate the presented technique by considering a simple example from the area of road 
transportation. For simplicity, let us assume that there are only three cities whose eco-efficiency has 
to be evaluated. Table 5 presents the data of economic value added and four environmental 
pressures. In the case of road transportation, there is not self-evident measure for the net economic 
benefit. One good candidate is the measure Vk = mileage price (€/km) × total road transportation 
mileage (km) – fuel price (€/l) × fuel consumption (l). This measure yet demands information about 
mileage and fuel prices.18 The environmental pressures can be estimated based on more detailed 
data of different emissions caused by a certain type of vehicle and the data concerning the vehicle 
fleet and the mileage. As discussed above, different emissions are aggregated to environmental 
pressures using well established conversion factors. 
  
 
Table 5: Example data related to eco-efficiency of road transportation in three cities 
 City 1 City 2 City 3 
Economic value added    
         Net economic benefit (thousand dollars) 100 80 140  
Environmental pressures:    
         Climate change (CO2 equivalents/year) 1200  300 2600 
         Acidification (acid equivalents/year) 39  10  44 
         Smog formation (tons of HC/year) 42 4  23 
         Dispersion of particles (tons of TPM/year) 143  20 87 
 
 
Consider the eco-efficiency measure of City 3. Eco-efficiency problem (5.6) becomes in this case 
 
                                                 
18 In principle, these prices can also be estimated (or replaced by shadow prices). 
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(5.8) 
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and the dual problem (5.7) reads as 
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Table 6 reports the optimal solutions to both these problems, as well as the similar problems for the 
other two cities. This table shows that city 2 is the only eco-efficient city in this sample. However, 
this does not yet mean that city 2 is absolutely eco-efficient, since eco-efficiency scores are relative. 
Hence, there may be some other cities, which were not included in this sample, but are more eco-
efficient compared to city 2. In any case, cities 1 and 3 have considerable room for improvement in 
their eco-efficiency ratios, compared with city 2.  
  
 
Table 6: Optimal solutions 
 City 1 City 2 City 3 
Eco-efficiency 0.321 1.000 0.402 
Prices  *pˆ * * *1 3 4
*
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0,
ˆ 7.96
p p p
p
= = =
=  
* * *
1 2 4
*
3
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0,
ˆ 20
p p p
p
= = =
=  
* * *
1 2 3
*
4
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0,
ˆ 0.02
p p p
p
= = =
=  
Weights  *λ * * *1 3 20, 1.25λ λ λ= = = * * *1 3 20, 1λ λ λ= = =  * * *1 3 20, 1.75λ λ λ= = =  
  
 
In the pricing problem (5.8) cities assign a positive price for themes in which they perform 
relatively well, assigning price of zero for those themes they perform poorly. Such extremely 
“unrealistic” valuations often occur in DEA models. Note, however, that the eco-efficiency scores 
of cities 1 and 2 can only further decrease if more balanced relative prices are applied. This example 
demonstrates that resorting to the ‘extremist’ DEA pricing approach may suffice to reveal 
significant inefficiencies without resorting to expensive valuation studies to find out more 
“realistic” economic values.  
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If certain relative prices are considered unacceptable for the purposes of the analysis, it is 
straightforward to exclude such prices from the DEA valuation by imposing additional linear 
constraints (called weight restrictions in the DEA literature). Since only the relative prices matter, 
the price restrictions must also be formulated in relative terms. For example, if we want to impose 
(just hypothetically) that the pressure on climate change is always at least twice as costly as 
pressure on acidification, then this constraint should be expressed as 1ˆ ˆ2 2p p≥ . It does not make 
sense to impose absolute restrictions (such as ) because we work with normalized prices; the 
absolute level of prices does not have any meaning, only the relative price level matters. 
2ˆ 1p ≥
 
The relative valuation is one of the key ideas behind the success of DEA. It works well in the 
context of eco-efficiency analysis where we are primarily interested in the economic value added 
per environmental pressure types of ratio measures. However, absolute prices of environmental 
impacts are of decisive importance in many type of environmental-economic analyses, such as 
Cost-Benefit Analysis. Can DEA approach work in the context of absolute pricing problems? This 
is what we are going to find out next. 
 
 
 
6. Cost-Benefit Analysis  
 
Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) typically concerns social evaluation of an investment 
project that involves significant environmental impacts, for example, construction of a new 
highway. Suppose there are N alternative candidate projects (e.g., different highway 
configurations). In contrast to the eco-efficiency analysis, which is especially useful for revealing 
improvement potential in the most poorly performing units, CBA focuses on identifying one 
optimal project (or the optimal combination of projects) to be implemented. Without a loss of 
generality, we will henceforth assume projects to be mutually exclusive, that is, only one of the 
projects can be implemented.19 
 
A CBA consists of a multiple stages, which usually include:  
 
1) the problem definition (i.e., what are the objectives, what are the alternatives, whose welfare is 
considered, and over what time period),  
2) identification of the physical impacts of each project (i.e., environmental impact analysis),  
valuation of the impacts,  
3) discounting of cost and benefit flows,  
4) selection of the project to be implemented based on the net present value test, and  
5) sensitivity analysis (i.e., is the result robust to small changes in parameter values).  
 
In this paper the focus will be on the valuation stage, which we consider to be the most challenging 
stage of the analysis. 
 
Assume that stages 1) and 2) have been completed: the setting has been defined and the economic 
costs and benefits of each project have been estimated. Let the net economic benefit of project n in 
time period t be denoted by Bnt. The net benefit is the difference of economic revenues and costs; it 
has a positive value in the periods where the total revenue exceeds the total cost, and a negative 
                                                 
19 If combinations of several projects can be implemented, we can always treat such combinations as ”new” alternative 
candidate projects. For example, if three projects A, B, C and any combinations thereof are possible, we can treat the 
model combinations (A, B, C, AB, AC, ABC) as mutually exclusive “projects”. 
 24
value when the costs exceed revenues. Suppose further that there are M relevant environmental 
impacts that should be considered. We will assume that the environmental impacts can be 
unambiguo d the impacts of project n in period t can be numerically represented 
by vector ( )1nt nt MntZ Z ′=Z … . As before, we shall refer to quantified data of the project n by capital 
symbols Bnt, Znt, and reserve the lower case symbols 
usly quantified, an
b, and z for arbitrary (theoretical) values net 
enefits and environmental impacts, respectively. 
c has direct 
ealth effects in humans and it also contributes to the climate change in the atmosphere. 
b
 
Before proceeding, the meaning of “environmental impact” is worth elaborating. By impact we here 
refer both to direct impacts do to the project (for example, loss of forest land due to highway, 
extinction of certain species) as well as pressures that contribute indirectly and over longer time 
scale to environmental problems (for example, emission of green house gases, depletion of natural 
resources). By impact we also refer to broader environmental themes such as acidification, not to 
specific substances that cause it. In case of acidification, for example, the different emissions (e.g. 
nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide) should be first converted to acid equivalents and then summed 
together to get an overall measure for the acidification pressure due to the project. Some harmful 
substances may contribute to several impacts, for example, carbon monoxide from traffi
h
 
As in the previous sections, we denote the unknown prices for the environmental impacts 
by ( )1,..., Mp p=p . The problem of how to estimate these prices has been one of the key issues in 
environmental economics, and constitutes the stage 3) of the usual CBA routine. We here deviate 
from the conventional approaches in that we do not try to “parameterize” the prices based on stated 
or revealed preference information, but rather treat the prices as unknown variables of the model. 
herefore, we next proceed to stage 4) and leave the determination of prices to later stages. 
ty cost of the foregone interest revenue. Discounting forms the step 4) of the usual CBA 
utine.  
nterest rate by r, the net present value of the economic benefits of project n can be 
alculated as  
(6.1) t
imilarly, the net present value of the environmental costs of project n can be calculated as 
(6.2) .nmt
d make the conversion to economic costs later. Observe that 
entity (6.1) can be re-written as  
T
 
Usually the economic benefits and environmental impacts vary over time. Discounting the costs and 
benefits that occur over time, to express them in net present value terms, is important because most 
project have considerable economic set-up costs while the benefits and the environmental impacts 
accumulate over a longer period. For example, a lump sum payment of one million dollar today is 
worth more than a million dollars of benefits accumulating over the next ten years due to the 
opportuni
ro
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If the prices of the environmental impacts (p) are constant over time (as we assume here), then we 
may first discount the impacts an
id
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(6.3) 
1 0
( ) (1 ) .tn m nmt
m t
NPV C p r Z−
= =
M ∞⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
sent value when the price 
n
en if we disregard the environmental impacts. Such projects can be safely 
e analysis, namely, the selection of 
e socially optimal project to be implemented. First, however, we further illustrate the setting by 
onsidering a stylized example from the area of transportation.  
 
 
The sum expressed in the parentheses is the discounted total environmental impact m for project n. 
Note that although we discount the physical impacts, the environmental impacts of the future are 
considered to be equally valuable as environmental impacts of today (i.e., we do not assume any 
time preference for the environmental impacts). The rationale for the discounting lies in the 
necessity to discount the monetary costs due to the opportunity cost of the foregone interest. As 
quation (6.2) shows, discounting costs or impacts yields the same net pree
vector p is constant over time. For consistency, the same interest rate r should be applied in 
discounting of both economic benefits and environmental impacts.  
 
The discounting stage 4) provides us with the discounted total environmental impacts denoted by 
Znm (i.e., the time index t is eliminated). Similarly, we use Bn for the total (discounted) net present 
value of the net economic benefits. If B  has a negative value, then project n does not make 
conomic sense eve
discarded at this stage. All remaining candidate projects are assumed to yield a strictly positive net 
economic benefit.  
 
e are now ready to proceed to the most interesting stage of thW
th
c
 
 
 
City 1 
Option  
A 
City 2 
forest 
village 
Option B 
Option  
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Figure 7: Illustration of the alternative highway configurations 
 
Suppose for simplicity that the municipal authorities consider implementing one of the four 
alternative highway projects labeled as A, B, C, and D connecting two major cities. Option A is to 
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improve the existing highway, and hence involves only small costs and benefits. Option B is to 
build a new, more direct highway connection through a pristine forest that lies between the two 
cities. This option has high economic benefits but large environmental costs. Option C is to by-pass 
the forest and build the road through urban areas. This option has almost equally high economic 
benefits but involves a high cost of deteriorating urban environment. Option C is to build a tunnel 
r the critical part of the highway. This option has high economic costs and benefits but smaller 
re assume that these 
iverse human effects can be aggregated by using meaningful and well-defined conversion factors 
lue. For the urban air quality we take into account the estimated number of people 
ffected, the seriousness of effect, and then applied the same discount factors as for economic net 
ts for which market prices do not exist. 
lternative approaches include multi criteria analysis and participatory methods. We next examine 
ow the valuation problem can be addressed using DEA. 
Table 7: Results of the economic and environ t assessments   
 
Improve the 
existing 
highway
highway 
through the 
fo
through an 
urban 
highway 
through a 
tu
fo
environmental impacts. The alternative highway configurations are illustrated by Figure 7. 
 
The environmental impact assessment indicates only two major environmental impacts that should 
be considered: the loss of forest-land and the deterioration of urban air quality. The urban air quality 
is influenced by a number of harmful substances such as particles and carbon monoxide, as well as 
noise and the risk of traffic accidents. To keep the example simple, we he
d
(in reality, keeping such diverse impacts disaggregated would be advisable).  
 
As noted already many times in the previous sections, the results of the economic and 
environmental impact assessments are summarized in Table 7. We have aggregated the economic 
costs and revenues to net present value of the benefits. In environmental impacts, we express the 
loss of forest-land in hectares and the deterioration in urban air quality as an index where zero is the 
current va
a
benefits.  
 
The key problem is that the economic benefits and environmental impacts are not further 
commensurable. Standard approach of the cost-benefit analysis is to use either stated preference 
techniques (e.g. contingent valuation) or revealed preference techniques (e.g. travel cost method) to 
estimate “economic” prices for the environmental impac
A
h
 
 
mental impac
A: B:
New 
rest
C: 
New 
highway 
area 
D:
New 
nnel
Discounted economic effects     
           Benefits (time saving, etc) 50 200 190 250
        - Costs (construction and maintenance) -10 -30 -60 -200
l. dollars) = 4 = = 130  =
 
       = Net economic benefit (mil 0  170  50
Total discounted environmental effects:  
         1. Loss of forest land (ha) 1 120 2 10
       2. Deterioration of urban air quality  2 3 60 12  
 
 
The net social benefit of project n (SBn) is the monetary benefit that is left after subtracting the cost 
f environmental impacts from the net economic benefits (both expressed in terms of the net present 
mally, SBn can be expressed as 
o
value). For
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(6.4) 
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In stage 4) we need to identify the project that offers the highest net social benefit. Now the price 
variables p must be determined. 
 
In the present context it is illustrative to view the DEA method from the game-theoretic perspective. 
Let us evaluate project k. Suppose the proponents of project k exhibit opportunistic, strategic 
behavior. Suppose further that the project proponents can order a bogus valuation study where they 
can manipulate the price estimates pˆ  to show the project k in the best possible lig t (e.g. by ph aying 
ribes for the respondents). How ld such aggressively opportunistic project proponents valuate 
ic project proponents cannot demonstrate their project to offer the social optimum, then 
e proponents of this 
roject can demonstrate over competing projects if they can choose non-negative prices  subject 
to the condition that project k must be socially beneficial. Formally, the optimal CA*  are 
obtained as the optimal solution to the following linear programming problem 
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the environmental impacts? What is the maximum comparative advantage that the proponents of 
project k can demonstrate over competing projects if they could choose the prices pˆ  at will?  
 
While the previous questions are extremely cynical, we believe these questions are still worth 
asking. The answers to these questions can guide us to more objective policy recommendations in 
the sense that subjective valuation of prices p is not required. In particular, if the most aggressively 
pportunisto
we have a strong argument for rejecting this project. If the proponents successfully demonstrate the 
benefits, we can objectively identify a range of prices under which project k is the socially optimal 
choice.      
 
The problem of the opportunistic project proponent can be addressed by using DEA. Specifically, 
we calculate the maximum comparative advantage of project k (CAk) that th
pˆ
 and *pˆ
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The “estimated” prices ˆ 0≥p  are the unknown variables of problem (6.5), and the net economic 
benefits 1 2, ,..., NB B B  and the vectors of environmental impacts 1 2, ,..., NZ Z Z  are known parameters 
of this linear programming problem. The first N-1 constraints compare in the pair-wise fashion the 
net benefits of project k relative to all competing projects. Because only one of the competing 
projects is chosen, the competitive advantage CA that is maximized in the objective function 
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depends on how well project k performs relative to its best competitor. Thus, only the smallest value 
of the net benefit differences counts. To qualify as the socially optimal choice, the net benefit of 
roject k must be greater than (or equal to) zero. The Nth constraint of (6.5) ensures that net benefit 
ima
prices ental impacts might be, there exists another project 
at yields a higher social net benefit. Therefore, projects with negative score in (6.5) can be 
t k can provide, even at best, me
ofitable at some point when prices p are increased. To make the final choice of which 
roject –if any- will be implemented, the DEA offers a platform for number of alternative 
ice is considerably easier than finding a specific point estimate. If 
 impact m is Lm and the upper bound is Um, we can simply insert in (6.5) 
ditional linear constra :  
 
hen the price ranges are gradually narrowed down, then at some one of the projects distinguishes 
 regarding the choice of prices. However, identifying and presenting the supporting price 
omains can become technically demanding especially when there are multiple environmental 
p
is non-negative at the est ted prices pˆ . 
 
If the optimal solution *kCA  to this problem is a negative number or zero, then such non-negative 
prices *ˆ 0≥p  for environmental impacts at which project k can yield the highest social net benefit 
do not exist. Whatever the  of environm
th
discarded as “inefficient”.  
 
On the other hand, if the optimal solution *kCA  is a positive number, then there exist non-negative 
prices *ˆ 0≥p  at which project k is socially optimal. In this case, project k is potentially an attractive 
investment project, so we diagnose it as “efficient”. The objective function *kCA  indicates the 
maximum monetary net benefit that this project can offer over the second best candidate (prices *pˆ  
maximize this comparative advantage). If *kCA  is large, then project k can present itself as be a 
uperior candidate at certain prices. If *  is small, then projeckCA rely s
a modest advantage over the competing candidates.  
 
When ranking the projects, the CA scores are not the only information to consider. In general, it is 
more important to assess if the prices *pˆ  are realistic or not. In practice, there typically exist several 
candidate projects that can demonstrate a positive CA at some prices. In any case, all projects 
become unpr
p
approaches. 
 
The first approach is to impose domain restrictions on the admissible prices p, as in the weigh-
restricted DEA approaches (See Section 7.2 for references). In problem (6.5) we only postulated 
that prices should be somewhere between zero and plus infinity. It is often possible to narrow down 
this interval to a more specific range on objective or subjective grounds. Typically, specifying a 
certain range for the admissible pr
the lower bound for price of
the ad ints
 
(6.6) .m m mL p U≤ ≤  
 
W
itself as the only project that can show a positive CA score.  
 
The second approach is to directly present the decision-makers the entire range of prices at which a 
given project is the socially optimal choice. Presenting such objective price ranges would enable the 
decision-makers to weigh the potential comparative advantages of the projects against the 
robustness
d
impacts.  
 
The third approach is to combine the DEA evaluation with the more traditional valuation 
techniques. We can check which of the objective price ranges the prices estimated by some other 
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technique(s) fall into. In this sense, DEA can be a supportive tool for sensitivity analysis in the 
traditional valuation approaches: we can see if a small change in the estimated prices changes the 
policy recommendation. DEA could also save the costs of the traditional valuation studies. If the 
DEA analysis is conducted prior to the valuation study, we can differentiate between those 
environmental impacts that are critically important for the decision and should be evaluated using 
ore expensive valuation techniques (such as CV), and those impacts which are unimportant for the 
o illustrate the presented technique, let us return to the highway construction example. Inserting 
numerical values from Table 1 in problem (6.5) to evaluate highway B (through the forest), we get  
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on dollars, which is based on the prices of zero for the loss of forest land 
nd 1.55 dollars for unit of urban air quality. For comparison, the optimal solutions for all projects 
e reported in Table 8. 
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This optimization finds shadow prices ˆ 0≥p  that make m BCA , i.e., the comparative advantage of 
highway B, as large as possible. The optimal solution to this problem gives the comparative 
advantage of 128.4 milli
a
ar
 
able f DE  CBA 
 A B C D 
CA  300 128.4 87.8 -15.9 
p1 27.50 0.00 
p2 6.25 1.55 0.00 1.51 
SB 0.0 165.3 127.8 21.1 
1.08 1.07 
 
 
The first row of Table 8 reports the comparative advantages (CA) scores obtained as the optimal 
solution to problem (6.5) for each project. We observe that project D has a negative CA score. This 
means that project D (i.e., the tunnel option) will never prove the optimal solution whichever prices 
we assign for the environmental impacts; one of the competing projects will always provide a 
reater social net benefit. Thus, we could discard project D by objective grounds without saying 
B can show considerable comparative advantage if the loss of 
rest area is considered to be inexpensive. Similarly, project C shows a large advantage if the 
g
anything about the prices of the environmental impacts.  
 
For alternatives A, B and C the CA score is a positive number. Project A can boast with the largest 
comparative advantage of 300 million dollars, but it is based on such large prices for the 
environmental impacts that its social net benefit falls to zero; the social net benefit is indicated on 
the fourth row labeled as SB. Project 
fo
urban air quality is of little concern.  
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In this case it is relatively simple to identify the entire range of prices at which project A, B, or C 
provides the highest social net benefit (subject to the constraint that this benefit must be non-
negative). These price ranges are illustrated in the two-dimensional price space in Figure 8. The 
horizontal axis represents the price of forest loss (dollars per hectare) and the vertical axis 
represents the price of urban air quality (dollars per index number). An estimate or a subjective 
judgment of prices (p1, p2) can be viewed as a point in this two dimensional diagram. If the prices of 
the environmental impacts coincide to triangle A, then project A should be implemented. Similarly, 
if the prices coincide in area B, then project B is the optimal one; if in triangle C, then project C 
ould be chosen. Finally, if the prices of both impacts are both sufficiently large that they fall 
outside areas A,B and C, then none of the projects should be implemented. 
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Figure 8: CBA in the price space20 
 
This diagram presents the objective picture based on the impact assessment, without making any 
judgment or estimation of the prices of environmental impacts. We see that the highway A is a very 
robust choice, offering the highest social net benefit with a large range of prices. Alternative B 
becomes optimal if we give a very small price for the loss of forest land (less than ninety cents per 
hectare). Similarly, alternative C is the optimal choice if the price of urban air quality is very low 
(less than 1.5 dollars per index number). Recall that we have already ruled out alternative D, does 
not provide the maximal social net benefit at any prices. This kind of diagram may help the decision 
maker to rule out some other alternatives. For example, if we consider the loss of forest land to be 
certainly more expensive than one dollar per hectare, then we can safely rule out alternative B. 
Further studies might be implemented to learn more about the price of urban air quality. Since 
 
20 Areas B and C have been truncated to make the figure more informative. Area B continues upwards to point (0, 56.7), 
and area C continues to the right to point (65, 0).  
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valuation studies such as contingent valuation are expensive to implement, this kind of a prior DEA 
study could save time and money by enabling the further valuation study to focus resources on the 
ost critical dimensions of the problem. After the price estimates have been obtained, the DEA 
pproach can provide a useful framework for sensitivity analysis.        
his section presents a brief, structured literature review of a selection of topics that are useful for 
 
gh of DEA occurred with Charnes et 
 (1978), who coined the name and popularized the approach in the field of operations research, 
   
al of Operational Research 2, 429-444. 
ission for 
 Shepard, R.W. (1953): Cost and Production Functions, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
 Shepard, R.W. (1970): Theory of Cost and Production Functions, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
of DEA include Färe et al. (1994), Coelli et al. (1998) and Cooper et al. 
000). The survey articles by Seiford (1996) and Taveres (2002) list thousands of references to 
 
• Cooper, W.W., L.M. Seiford and K. Tone (2000): Data Envelopment Analysis: A Comprehensive Text 
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The Journal of Productivity Analysis 7, 99-137. 
 Tavares, G. (2002): A Bibliography of Data Envelopment Analysis, Rutcor Research Reports 1/2002. 
m
a
 
 
 
7. Further reading 
 
T
applying the approaches discussed above.
 
7.1 DEA: history and the state of the art 
 
The intellectual roots of DEA lie in the activity analysis of Koopmans (1951), production theory of 
Shephard (1953, 1970), and Linear Programming (Danzig, 1949). The key ideas of DEA date back 
to the seminal paper by Farrell (1957), but the real breakthrou
al.
which resulted in rapid technical development of the method. 
• Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes (1978): Measuring the Efficiency of Decision-Making Units, 
European Journ
• Dantzig, G.B. (1949): Programming of Interdependent Activities II: Mathematical Model, Econometrica 
17, 200 – 211. 
• Farrell, M.J. (1957): The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, Journal of the Statistical Society Series 
A, General, 120, 253-281. 
• Koopmans, T.C. (Ed.) (1951): Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. Cowles Comm
Research in Economics, Monograph No. 13, Wiley, New York. 
•
•
 
 
Recent textbook treatments 
(2
articles published on DEA. 
• Coelli, T., D.S. Prasada Rao and G.E. Battese (1998): An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
with Models, Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston. 
, R., S. Grosskopf and C.A.K. Lovell (1994): Pro
• Seiford, L.M. (1996): Data Envelopment Analysis: The Evaluation of the State of the Art (1978-1995)
•
 
 
7.2 Computation 
 
Algorithms for solving linear programming problems are widely available as part of any optimizing 
software (e.g., GAMS, GAUSS). Modern spreadsheet solvers (e.g. Excel solver) can also handle 
increasingly large problems. The advantage of using some general purpose software is the 
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flexibility to adjust the model specification to meet the purposes of analysis. Also tailor made DEA 
software are available for those who do not want to write their own computer code. A drawback of 
ese software packages is that they only facilitate a limited selection of possible model 
emic use) include 
 
 A Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) by Tim Coelli:  
m 
ml 
 The Warwick software: http://www.deazone.com/software/ 
• Co
 Zhu, J. (2002): Quantitative Models for Performance Evaluation and Benchmarking: DEA with 
Spreadsheets and DEA Excel Solver, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
ral, different 
kinds of restrictions can be particularly useful in environmental applications of DEA. The following 
 
• Alle n and E. Thanassoulis (1997): Weights Restrictions and Value 
s 
alysis, 
• Kuo ost (2001): Measuring Economic Efficiency with Incomplete Price 
nal 
 Pedraja-Chaparro, F., J. Salinas-Jimenez, and P. Smith (1997): On the Role of Weight Restrictions in 
Data Envelopment Analysis, Journal of Productivity Analysis 8, 215-230.  
have defined it. There are, however, 
number of studies in which environmental performance is measured in the DEA framework. The 
llowing lists (or classifications) include only part of them.  
 
 
th
specifications. 
 
The most widely used shareware software (free for acad
• The Efficiency Measurement System (EMS) by Holger Scheel:  
 http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/lsfg/or/scheel/ems/
•
 http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/software.ht
 
Popular commercial software packages include: 
• OnFront: http://www.emq.com/software.ht
•
• FrontierAnalyst: http://www.banxia.com/ 
 
Two recent DEA textbooks include add-ins for the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet  
oper, W.W., L.M. Seiford, and K. Tone (2000) (See Section 7.1). 
•
 
 
7.3 Weight restrictions 
 
Earlier in this paper we presented weight restrictions (or price ranges) and discussed shortly how 
they can be used in the eco-efficiency and cost-benefit analysis. Weight restrictions can also be 
exploited when applying DEA for measuring environmental performance. In gene
list introduces some of the most important references concerning weight restrictions.   
n, R., A. Athanassopoulos, R.G. Dyso
Judgements in Data Envelopment Analysis: Evolution, Development and Future Directions, Annal
of Operations Research 73, 13 -34.  
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Journal of the Operational Research Society 39, 563-576. 
smanen, T., and G.T. P
Information: With an Application to European Commercial Banks, European Journal of Operatio
Research 134, 43-58. 
•
 
 
7.4 DEA in environmental economics 
 
Cost-benefit analysis by using DEA is a completely new area of study and hence, there are no 
references for it in the literature of environmental economics. As yet, only a few papers have 
concentrated on measuring eco-efficiency by DEA as we 
fo
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